Includes bibliographical references and index.

Cover
Self and Identity
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Introduction
1: What Matters in Survival
I. Appropriate First-Personal Anticipation and Appropriate Future-Directed Self-Interested Concern
II. My Answer to the What Question
III. Consciousness and Survival
IV. What Matters to You with Regard to the Future
V. Conclusion
2: On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity
I. My Answer to the Why Question
II. More on the Metaphysics of Persistence
III. Not the Criterion of Personal Identity over Time
IV. An Unanswered Question
V. Conclusion 3: On the Necessity of Personal Identity
I. An Argument for the Necessity of Personal Identity
II. Parfit's Argument against the Necessity of Personal Identity
III. Parfit's Argument, Stage Theory, and Perdurance
IV. Parfit's Argument and Endurance
V. Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity
VI. Conclusion
4: The Same Self
I. Three Selfers
II. First-Personal Access to a Point of View
III. The Same Self and Numerical Identity
IV. Growing Up
V. Other Transformations
VI. Conclusion
5: The Same Self-Narrative
I. The Self-Narrative Account II. The Same Self-Narrative and the Same Self
III. The Same Self-Narrative and Numerical Identity
IV. Growing Up Redux
V. Other Changes in Self-Narrative
VI. Other Work for Self-Narrative and the Same Self
VII. Conclusion
6: Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity
I. The Agential Continuity Account
II. The Narrative Continuity Account
III. Agential Continuity, Narrative Continuity, and Numerical Identity
IV. Some Significant Transformations
V. Other Work for Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity VI. More on Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity
VII. Conclusion
7: The Hope of Glory
I. The Hope of Survival
II. The Hope of Transformation
III. The Hope and Psychological Continuity
IV. Survival Does Not Come in Degrees
V. The Tedium Objection
VI. The Irrationality Objection
VII. Conclusion
References
Index

What Matters in Survival
On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity
On the Necessity of Personal Identity
The Same Self
The Same Self-Narrative
Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity
The Hope of Glory

"The personal identity literature is fragmented. There is a literature on the normative topic of 'what matters in survival'. And there is a separate literature on the metaphysics of persons. But in Self and Identity, Trenton Merricks shows that some important claims about personal identity cannot even be articulated, much less evaluated, unless these topics are brought together. Merricks says that what matters in survival is constituted by its being appropriate to first-personally anticipate, and have self-interested concern with regard to, a future person's experiences. So what matters in survival is not constituted by identity with a future person. So identity is not what matters in survival. But Merricks argues that-given a metaphysics of 'enduring' persons-identity with a future person explains why it is appropriate to first-personally anticipate, and have self-interested concern with regard to, that person's experiences. So identity delivers what matters in survival. Some claim that what matters in survival is delivered not by identity, but instead by psychological continuity. Or by having the 'same self', that is, the same values, desires, and projects. Or by narrative connectedness. Or by unity of agency. Merricks argues that these claims-unlike the claim that identity delivers what matters in survival-cannot accommodate all the ways in which personal transformations can be good, or bad, for someone. At the end of Self and Identity, Merricks puts his conclusions about what matters in survival through their paces by applying them to a new topic: personal immortality"-- Provided by publisher.

CASG Master of Arts in Philosophy

In English