000			05254nam a22003857a 4500
003			phtghnu
005			20250123143017.0
007			ta
008			210811s2022 enk 000 0 eng
010			_a 2021944981
020			_a9780192843432 _q(hardback)
040			_beng _erda _cHNU
050	0	0	_aMLCS 2022/40206 (B)
082			_223 _3GCG _a111.82 M55 _b2022
100	1		_aMerricks, Trenton, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSelf and identity / _cTrenton Merricks.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom : _bClarendon Press, an imprint of Oxford University Press, _c2022.
300			_aviii, 184 pages ; _c21 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505			_aCover Self and Identity Copyright Dedication Contents Introduction 1: What Matters in Survival I. Appropriate First-Personal Anticipation and Appropriate Future-Directed Self-Interested Concern II. My Answer to the What Question III. Consciousness and Survival IV. What Matters to You with Regard to the Future V. Conclusion 2: On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity I. My Answer to the Why Question II. More on the Metaphysics of Persistence III. Not the Criterion of Personal Identity over Time IV. An Unanswered Question V. Conclusion 3: On the Necessity of Personal Identity I. An Argument for the Necessity of Personal Identity II. Parfit's Argument against the Necessity of Personal Identity III. Parfit's Argument, Stage Theory, and Perdurance IV. Parfit's Argument and Endurance V. Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity VI. Conclusion 4: The Same Self I. Three Selfers II. First-Personal Access to a Point of View III. The Same Self and Numerical Identity IV. Growing Up V. Other Transformations VI. Conclusion 5: The Same Self-Narrative I. The Self-Narrative Account II. The Same Self-Narrative and the Same Self III. The Same Self-Narrative and Numerical Identity IV. Growing Up Redux V. Other Changes in Self-Narrative VI. Other Work for Self-Narrative and the Same Self VII. Conclusion 6: Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity I. The Agential Continuity Account II. The Narrative Continuity Account III. Agential Continuity, Narrative Continuity, and Numerical Identity IV. Some Significant Transformations V. Other Work for Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity VI. More on Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity VII. Conclusion 7: The Hope of Glory I. The Hope of Survival II. The Hope of Transformation III. The Hope and Psychological Continuity IV. Survival Does Not Come in Degrees V. The Tedium Objection VI. The Irrationality Objection VII. Conclusion References Index
505			_aWhat Matters in Survival On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity On the Necessity of Personal Identity The Same Self The Same Self-Narrative Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity The Hope of Glory
520			_a"The personal identity literature is fragmented. There is a literature on the normative topic of 'what matters in survival'. And there is a separate literature on the metaphysics of persons. But in Self and Identity, Trenton Merricks shows that some important claims about personal identity cannot even be articulated, much less evaluated, unless these topics are brought together. Merricks says that what matters in survival is constituted by its being appropriate to first-personally anticipate, and have self-interested concern with regard to, a future person's experiences. So what matters in survival is not constituted by identity with a future person. So identity is not what matters in survival. But Merricks argues that-given a metaphysics of 'enduring' persons-identity with a future person explains why it is appropriate to first-personally anticipate, and have self-interested concern with regard to, that person's experiences. So identity delivers what matters in survival. Some claim that what matters in survival is delivered not by identity, but instead by psychological continuity. Or by having the 'same self', that is, the same values, desires, and projects. Or by narrative connectedness. Or by unity of agency. Merricks argues that these claims-unlike the claim that identity delivers what matters in survival-cannot accommodate all the ways in which personal transformations can be good, or bad, for someone. At the end of Self and Identity, Merricks puts his conclusions about what matters in survival through their paces by applying them to a new topic: personal immortality"-- _cProvided by publisher.
521			_aCASG _bMaster of Arts in Philosophy
546			_aIn English
650			_aIdentity (Philosophical concept).
650			_aSelf.
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d4 _eepcn _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK _h100-199
999			_c135570 _d135570